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Abstract 
 The philosophical works of Emmanuel Levinas rely heavily on the revelatory face to face 
encounter with The Absolute Other. In this encounter the individual is forced to recognize 
difference, ethics, and in turn finds freedom. A question remains at the centre of this revelation 
in how the finite individual is meant to recognize the absolute infinite? This thesis offers a 
response to this question by presenting faith (an outwardly directed hope) as a preparatory 
condition of the individual awarded by the Feminine that ultimately bridges the gap between the 
finite and the infinite.   
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Introduction 
 At first glance, the philosophy of Alterity as presented by Emmanuel Levinas seems to 
rely solely on an unexpected revelation. Throughout his works, we are presented with a hard-
lined ethical picture that confronts the individual with an encounter that appears to trigger a 
mysterious and radical internal transformation that brings about ethics, freedom, and the 
possibility of God. According to Levinas’ account, the individual comes face to face with an 
Other who awakens in him the responsibility and freedom inherent to ethics, thus forcing him to 
obligation. Given this reading, it would seem that Levinas’ philosophy comes to fruition through 
a passive experience, i.e. an outside intervening force which catalyzes the transformation of the 
individual. In turn the individual appears, through no action of his own, to realize ethics and the 
possibility of God’s existence. Reading Levinas in this manner implies that there is a spiritual 
nature to the face-to-face encounter and subsequently removes the causality of the individual, if 
only partly. This is evident when we consider that under this reading, the prior actions of the 
individual do nothing to cause said revelation. To the contrary, the individual must simply meet 
an Other and is somehow able to experience all that this encounter brings with it. While this 
passive view of Levinas’ account of Alterity effectively demonstrates the internal workings of 
the face-to-face encounter, it opens up Levinas’ work to a plethora of criticism. How is it that a 
finite being can experience the infinite? To this point, what exactly is demonstrable from the 
notion of revelation? Meaning, what – if anything – can be understood from revelation? Given 
that the very idea of revelation is that it escapes explanation, how philosophical is Levinas’ 
account of an ethical experience? Should we merely take it for granted, without any possibility of 
examination? 
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 Now, it would be possible to simply dismiss this reading of Levinas as an ill-informed or 
misguided interpretation of his works, but considering the level of importance that he places on 
the face-to-face encounter and how it imposes ethical obligation on the subject, ignoring this 
passivity would simply be avoiding the problem. The fact remains that in order for Levinas’ 
account to have some sort of practical significance, this notion of a revelation must be explained 
and its mechanisms brought to light. The easiest way of going about this is to look for other 
examples of the notion of revelation with the goal being to elucidate how it occurs. Some help is 
found in the works of certain authors within philosophy of religion, though a problem remains as 
most accounts of revelation seem to mirror Levinas’ own, ultimately suggesting that the cause of 
internal change is external to the subject, out of his hands, so to speak. For example, Alvin 
Plantinga in his work Warranted Christian Belief relies heavily on the notion of spiritual 
intervention to bring about the internal change of the individual, going so far as to cite the Holy 
Spirit as one of the foundations of religious belief. This is made evident when Plantinga defines 
faith as:  
A firm and certain knowledge of God’s benevolence towards us, founded upon the truth 
of the freely given promise in Christ, both revealed to our minds and sealed upon our 
hearts through the Holy Spirit.1 
 
While this may be a neat way of saying that faith is an acceptance of God's existence, the move 
still stems from a revelatory intervention of a transcendent being (i.e. the Holy Spirit) and tells us 
very little of revelation itself. Instead we are left in the same position as we are with Levinas, 
attempting to find a cause in a Being or experience that is inexplicable. This is not to say that 
Plantinga or Levinas are wrong, but what can philosophy – let alone phenomenology in the case 
of the latter – say about such a moment?  
                                                 
1 Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 309. 
  Page 7 of 64 
 
Perhaps a way to resolve this enigma is to approach it sideways, i.e. through the faith that 
is required to “accept” revelation. Could it be that faith is the preparatory mechanism for 
Levinas’ revelation? Could it be that faith in fact sets up the individual’s encounter with the 
Other? What if the individual, prior to his encounter with the Other, experiences an interaction 
that prepares him for the face-to-face encounter? And only then could he be able to recognize the 
Alterity of the Other as infinite and compelling? Revelation of otherness and the ethical 
responsibility that ensues, one that is absolutely binding, does not happen Deus ex machina, but 
is shaped by a previous activity where the subject develops a proclivity towards the Other that 
helps to bridge the gap between the finite and the infinite. If successful, this approach would 
maintain the miraculous nature of the face-to-face encounter from the individual’s perspective, 
without leaving it completely mysterious, that is, without ignoring the individual’s efforts 
towards its realization.   
 Herein lies the goal of this thesis: to demonstrate the preparatory conditions and 
mechanisms that allow Levinas’ subject to come to terms with the infinite “height” of the Other, 
the very transcendence that simultaneously constrains him into absolute obligation and sets his 
freedom in motion, as the following pages shall demonstrate. To articulate this, we will need to 
describe the subject’s initial and guiltless egoism, one that seeks shelter in the comfort of the 
House, yet that also begins to open up to another – Feminine – presence. The retreat into the 
Home does indeed indicate a need for safety, but it also announces hospitality, a space the subject 
begins to prepare for an outsider or a foreigner (l’Étranger).  
We will then turn to the appearance of the Other that breaks the subject’s solipsism. 
Infinite and ineffable, the Other suddenly questions the self’s happy enjoyment of the world. 
What the latter took for his own, exclusively, he must now give to the Other who towers above 
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him in absolute authority. He desires him in a way that cannot be compared to the needs he 
sought to satisfy in the world, a metaphysical Desire.  
This is the moment of revelation we considered so problematic at the outset. To risk an 
examination of it, we have chosen the lens of faith. Though Levinas says very little about it in his 
works, there is a quote from a 1986 interview with Levinas, that caught our attention and 
provides clues towards understanding the encounter and its ramifications:  
Faith is not a question of the existence or non-existence of God. It is believing that love 
without reward is valuable. It is often said ‘God is love’. God is the commandment of 
love. ‘God is love’ means that He loves you. But this implies that the primary thing is 
your own salvation. In my opinion, God is a commandment to love. God is the one who 
says that one must love the other.2 
 
From this, it is difficult to see what role faith plays, exactly, though it is clear that it is 
instrumental in binding the individual to his unconditional duty to the Other. Faith does not 
confirm the existence of God, but of his command, Thou shall not kill. In other words, faith 
grounds the conviction that the divine exists in obligation, in my infinite responsibility to the 
Other. It is a mechanism which drives the individual to act in accordance with the judgments 
(commandments) of the Other. To put this otherwise, faith dictates a way of being for the 
individual.3 The revelation’s capacity to astonish and transform the subject draws its power from 
the Other’s transcendence, but it does not happen ad hoc, in the barren soul of an aimless self. It 
occurs in a being, an “existent” who has already, though ever so slightly, turned its eye towards 
the horizon of the Infinite. This is not to diminish the authority of the Other, but to emphasize all 
the work required to bow before it.  
  
                                                 
2 Tamra Wright, Peter Hughes, and Alison Ainley, "The Paradox of Morality," in The Provocation of Levinas: 
Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 177. 
3 This notion falls in line with that of the Feminine and will be discussed later in this thesis,  as faith will be shown 
to arise from the encounter with the Feminine way of being.  
  Page 9 of 64 
 
Chapter One: Groundwork 
 
 Before engaging with Levinas' philosophical thought, it is important to start by clarifying 
the terms and notions he uses to articulate his metaphysics. On metaphysics itself, he writes the 
following:  
It is turned toward "elsewhere" and the "otherwise" and the "other." For in the most 
general form it has assumed in the history of thought it appears as a movement going 
forth from a world that is familiar to us, whatever be that yet unknown lands that bound 
it or that it hides from view, from an "at home" ["chez soi"] which we inhabit, toward an 
alien outside-of-oneself [hors-de-soi], toward a yonder.4 
 
What is made clear from this passage is the very foundation of Levinas' thought; an essential 
separation between two aspects of human life, namely the familiar aspect of the individual and 
the foreign (transcendent) aspect which is wholly separate from him. From this absolute 
separation we are left to consider how these two aspects of human experience are able to interact 
with one another. What is required for the individual to acknowledge the transcendent and in turn 
live an ethically responsible life is some way of bridging the familiar world of egoism with that 
of the absolutely foreign that transcends his grasp. Let us unpack this in the lines that follow. 
 The first aspect of human life articulated by Levinas is the familiar world of the 
individual, a world that is dictated by the ego’s entrenchment towards action and is demarcated 
by a subjective perspective. This can be seen when we consider how Levinas describes the 
individual, or rather how Levinas describes the experience of the individual as an "I", namely,  to 
experience the world through an egoistic lens. As Levinas writes:  
                                                 
4 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne 
University Press, 2013), 33.  
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To be I is, over and above any individuation that can be derived from a system of 
references, to have identity as one's content. The I is not a being that always remains the 
same, but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its 
identity throughout all that happens to it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of 
identification.5 
 
For Levinas, the "I" looks at the world, and in his gaze he can seize, consume, and transform it. 
The process of self-individuation, of both recognizing and reinforcing one's own personal 
identity is not just an inescapable aspect of one's life for Levinas; self individuation is literally 
what defines existing as an individual. When Levinas speaks of a "being whose existing consists 
in identifying itself," he makes plain the very foundation of a human existence, i.e. the persistent 
cycle of self-identification that founds our subjective existence. The best evidence for this 
assertion is found in our inability to find an example that counters it. There is no situation 
experienced by an individual that isn't marked by its subjectivity. As Levinas writes of the 
individual's existence:  
I touch an object, I see the other. But I am not the other.  I am all alone. It is thus the 
being in me, the fact that I exist, my existing, that constitutes the absolutely intransitive 
element, something without intentionality or relationship. One can exchange everything 
between beings except existing. In this sense, to be is to be isolated by existing.6     
 
From this we see that for Levinas, every aspect of an individual’s life –from the moment they are 
born to the moment that they die – is one that is driven by egoism; not the blameworthy 
selfishness of a given miscreant, but a starting point, so to speak, that initiates action and a first 
take on the world. Presumably this holds despite intervention, despite enlightenment, and despite 
revelation, for if an individual exists, that existence must be founded in subjectivity. In other 
                                                 
5 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 36.  
6 Emmanuel Levinas, Time & The Other (and additional essays), (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 
1987), 42.  
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words, to be alive is to exist as an "I"; a conscious being who is able to act and control said 
actions.  
 Now, to be an "I" for Levinas is not just about existence; it is about action. The "I" is one 
who effects, consumes, and appropriates the world by manipulating it to conform to his own 
subjective desires:  
It is enough to walk, to do [faire], in order to grasp anything, to take. In a sense 
everything is in the site, in the last analysis everything is at my disposal, even the stars, 
if I but reckon them, calculate the intermediaries or the means.7 
 
It follows that each individual – each "I" or “ego” – contains an inescapable entrenchment in 
action. To properly expound on the notion of action as being linked to subjectivity it is important 
to first consider perspective and how it relates to the individual. As mentioned above, according 
to Levinas the individual is able to experience the two aspects which make up life as a human 
being: the familiar world and the transcendent. The familiar world of the individual is primarily 
dictated by the self individuation that founds the subjectivity of the individual through his 
existence as an "I". In other words, this world becomes familiar to the individual. From this it 
seems uncontroversial to put forward that if the world is appropriated by the individual, then his 
perspective dominates it, i.e. the individual not only dictates the importance of objects within his 
point of view, but he also comprehends said objects. This follows when we consider what it 
means to put something into perspective. Taken in a somewhat literal sense, the individual 
through his perspective is able to grasp an object. Just like an individual can physically seize an 
object, the perspective of the individual grasps it through comprehension, he absorbs it and 
assimilates it. In this sense, the individual makes his a world that becomes increasingly familiar. I 
                                                 
7 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37.  
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hold them in my view, in my thought, and in my understanding in a totalizing movement, despite 
their resistance, i.e. Sameness. Objects of the world come under my control and are made to 
satisfy my desires without asking. 
The above assertions are made clear in Levinas when he writes in the original French: 
"tout est ici, tout m'appartient; tout à l'avance est pris avec la prise originelle du lieu, tout est 
com-pris".8 What is important to note regarding this quote is lost in English. Commonly, we 
would translate "com-pris" into comprehended or understood, but in doing so we lose the deeper 
meaning. This past participle refers not only to one’s understanding of an object, but also to 
one’s consumption of it, to an inclusion or, if you prefer, to a totality. Everything for the 
individual is "com-pris" or included in it. Our subjectivity grasps objects, taking them into our 
perspective and through this form of consumption, we find our inherent power (ability to act).  
To be sure my own most inward sphere of intimacy appears to me as foreign or hostile; 
usage-objects, foods, the very world we inhabit are other in relation to us. But the 
alterity of the I and the world inhabited is only formal; as we have indicated, in a world 
in which I sojourn this alterity falls under my powers.9 
 
This power, this constant and relentless consumptive force within the subjective existence of the 
individual is ever present, never ceasing and in turn represents a basic and central aspect of the 
individual, namely a deep entrenchment in solipsistic being. 
Levinas' Happy Atheist  
 So far we have examined Levinas' account of the self’s existence, but this account is only 
a fraction of what it means to be an individual. The fact of the matter remains that we do not 
merely exist; we live and we enjoy living as selfish entities. What this means for Levinas is that 
                                                 
8 Emmanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: Essai sur l’extériorité, (La Haye, Martinus Nijhoff, Netherlands, 1961), 27. 
9 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 38. 
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our entrenchment in action, our persistent self identification, and our perspective all aim to 
ensure a happy and joyful life. For Levinas, "pure existing is ataraxy; happiness is 
accomplishment",10 meaning that the existence of the individual seems to have a predisposition 
which is meant to foster personal happiness. This is key, for the movement of uprooting that 
pulls the self out of his egoism and towards obligation to the Other is not motivated by 
resentment or hostility towards this world. The subject actually enjoys his earthly, self-centered 
existence, he savors it; yet something more, infinitely greater than this mundane enjoyment, will 
eventually bring him to strive for something greater than his own personal desires, that is, 
absolute responsibility.  
 As it stands, before the revelation, the individual can be seen as enjoying his actions and 
his wants. His life is in and of itself an accomplishment. And with this in mind, Levinas puts 
forward that we as individuals do not merely live; rather we relish our existence and wallow in 
our selfish wants. In this sense the individual does not exist in a place but rather dwells in it. This 
notion of dwelling is a mode of being that is not only valid, but legitimate. Evidence for this is 
presented by Levinas with the introduction of the dwelling and its relation to self-maintenance: 
Dwelling is the very mode of maintaining oneself [se tenir] not as the famous serpent 
grasping itself by biting onto its tail, but as the body that, on the earth exterior to it, 
holds itself up and can.11  
 
Dwelling for Levinas represents a key aspect regarding the ultimate purpose of the entrenchment 
towards action that accompanies the individual, namely, personal independence. As mentioned 
above, the individual – due to his perspective and in turn his movement of appropriation – views 
the world as his own and therefore sees himself as being self-sufficient. This is not yet a 
                                                 
10 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 113. 
11 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37. 
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condemnation of egoism for Levinas, who recognizes that the first movement of the self 
necessarily implies not only some control over a world that threatens the self, but enjoyment in 
doing so: 
Things refer to possession, can be carried off, are furnishings; the medium from which 
they come to me lies escheat, a common fund or terrain, essentially non-possessable, 
"nobody's": earth, sea, light, city. Every relation or possession is situated within the non-
possessable which envelops or contains without being able to be contained or 
enveloped. We shall call it the elemental.12 
 
The elemental, or the world offered to the subject as an object of manipulation and consumption, 
is seemingly at the mercy of the individual, but can also be against him. The individual has the 
capacity, the power, to manipulate and grasp the elements of nature, yet if left exposed to these 
elements he would undoubtedly be at risk. As a result we as individuals experience a fearful or at 
least cautious attitude towards the world. It seems uncontroversial to claim that this fear is not 
misplaced, for the world in its hostility has within it a potential to alter or dispose of the self. To 
put it simply, no one is immune to the potential harm of the hostility of the world, of Being, a 
threat that continually looms over the subject.  
 Levinas writes that "the world, foreign and hostile, should, in good logic, alter the I".13 
By this Levinas is pointing to the hostility or resistance that is present within the elemental world 
and the logical conclusion that accompanies the individual's recognition of it, namely, the 
alteration of the ego whether through injury, hardship, or death. It is in response to this 
recognition that the individual seeks to construct a house, a way of "maintaining oneself [se 
tenir]"14 in spite of the hostile elements of the familiar world. The self-maintenance that Levinas 
                                                 
12 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 131. 
13 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37. 
14 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 37. 
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speaks of when he mentions dwelling is not merely a statement regarding security; rather it 
speaks to the ability of the individual to remain an individual, meaning it allows the individual to 
articulate his own ipseity or self identity. This is made clear by Steven Gans in his paper on 
Levinas and Pontalis: 
Dwelling is a stage beyond the solipsism of enjoyment, of ‘living from’ the things 
within the world, of property, possession and totalization. Dwelling is prior to the 
degeneration of desire into need, since it provides the window which gives the occasion 
for the objectifying look which seeks to grasp, dominate, possess and transform the 
world into a storehouse of products for use.15 
 
From this we see that the dwelling or home is not just a celebration of the accomplishments of 
the individual nor is it merely a result of the individual's mastery of the world. To the contrary, 
dwelling is a result of ipseity (personal identification); it is the manner by which the individual 
addresses the elemental, that is, his mastery over the world and following separation and 
independence from it. As Levinas writes:  
The possibility of possessing, that is, of suspending the very alterity of what is only at 
first other, and other relative to me, is the way of the same. I am at home with myself in 
the world because it offers itself to or resists possession [...]This reversion of the alterity 
of the world to self-identification must be taken seriously; the "moments" of this 
identification—the body, the home, labour, possession, economy—are not to figure as 
empirical and contingent data, laid over the formal skeleton of the same; they are the 
articulations of this structure.16 
 
From the above quote, we see that for Levinas, this reinforcement and justification directly 
informs how the individual lives. The building of a home and in turn dwelling in it, can be seen 
as the way that the individual's life is an extension of his egoistic existence. Alone, the individual 
is compelled to separate himself from the familiar world partly from fear of the unpredictability 
                                                 
15 Steven Gans, "Levinas and Pontalis," in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert Bernasconi 
and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 87. 
16 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 38. […] added by me to maintain subject clarity.  
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of the elemental, but mainly as a way of solidifying his own independence and happiness. These 
are the conditions for happiness, one that is driven by egoism and self-identification and is made 
to live in a manner that ensures the reinforcement and justification of his independence and 
happiness. 
 So far, Levinas' account of the individual’s self-centered existence doesn’t seem to call 
for faith. What need would there be for it? As Chris Harris rightly points out in his work 
"Towards an Understanding of Home: Levinas And The New Testament":  
This separated I, focused on its own physical and intellectual pleasures, is of course an 
atheist. There is no move toward the transcendent. Yet Levinas is not critical of this 
atheism. It is simply a fact. "To be I, atheist, at home with oneself, separated, happy, 
created—these are synonyms" (Lévinas 1969,148). More positively, the separated I is 
capable of the interiority and the freedom which resists totalization by the State and 
other institutions.17 
 
The individual, when considered alone, is happy, strong, independent, and as a result seems to 
have no need for faith. Levinas takes the individual's atheism even further giving it such a 
privileged position that he even cites it as being a direct result of the will and ironically as a gift 
from God:  
It is certainly a great glory for the creator to have set up a being capable of atheism, a 
being which, without having been causa sui, has an independent view and word and is at 
home with itself. We name "will" a being conditioned in such a way that without being 
causa sui is first with respect to its cause. The psychism is the possibility for such a 
being. The psychism will be specified as sensibility, the element of enjoyment, as 
egoism.18      
  
From this it is apparent that even though we do not create ourselves (are causa sui), we do in a 
sense, shape our own lives through the pursuit of our happiness, desire, and egoistic drive, that 
                                                 
17 Chris Harris, "Towards an Understanding of Home: Levinas And The New Testament," Religious Education 90, 
no. 3/4 (Summer/Fall, 1995): 438.  
18 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 58-59.  
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is, we live an atheistic existence that is independent, separated from any other reference. This 
concept is made especially clear by Michael Barnes in his essay “The Intimacy of Distance: On 
Faith Learning From Faith” where he breaks down the role of atheism as found within Levinas’ 
religious works:   
So, if we are to be genuinely free and responsible human beings, God too has to be free 
to “keep [H]is distance,” precisely so as not to come so close that our humanity is 
swamped by feelings of the spiritual, the numinous, the sacred. In fact, for Levinas the 
religious experience of the faithful Torah observant Jew is precisely not  vested in any 
sort of mystical awareness; it is, rather, to be found in the conviction of being 
commanded despite any such “inner” assurance […] faith takes its stand on the paradox 
of “absent” or veiled presence, the God who is revealed only in what Levinas calls a 
“trace.” This enigmatic term, as Levinas uses it, refers not to any residual form which 
betrays the presence of God, but to how the other enters consciousness from beyond, 
from “the height” which is irreducible to Being.19 
 
As Barnes points out, for Levinas the atheistic state of the individual is not a weakness to be 
overcome, rather it is a precondition that allows the individual to be open to Otherness and the 
revelation of God that accompanies it. As Levinas writes: 
To relate to the absolute as an atheist is to welcome the absolute purified of the violence 
of the sacred. In the dimension of height in which its sanctity, that is, his separation, is 
presented, the infinite does not burn the eyes that are lifted onto him. He speaks; he does 
not have the mythical format that is impossible to confront and would hold the eye and 
its invisible meshes.20 
 
The atheist is a spiritual blank slate, meaning that he is not compelled to behave in accordance 
with spiritual beliefs. In turn the atheist is only concerned with his wants and needs. From this, 
the atheist then can be seen as not only happy, but especially receptive to the possibility of 
further and deeper happiness. It is here that we read Levinas' praise of atheism split from our 
modern notion, in that the atheistic state of the individual for Levinas is precisely what allows for 
                                                 
19 Michael Barnes, “The Intimacy of Distance: On Faith Learning From Faith,” Spiritus; A Journal of Christian 
Spirituality 6, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 53. 
20 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 77.  
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the individual to come to realize the existence of God. To put this in words that relate to the 
redefining of faith, the atheistic individual being free from any preconceptions regarding 
spirituality, is receptive to a faith that is worthy despite his happiness and in turn is also receptive 
to the possibility of God. This becomes evident when Levinas considers the very basic fact that 
informs an individual's life, namely, the fact that we are not ultimately alone. While the 
convictions of the religious man would hold that other people ought to be considered as part of 
God's creation in need of either salvation or religious community, Levinas' atheistic individual is 
able to look upon others without any preconceived confessional bias. This puts the individual in 
a position which allows him to consider the Other beyond his specific background, and his voice 
as a universal command. 
The Atheist & The Other 
 Up to this point I have expounded on the notion of the individual as presented by 
Levinas. The individual as ego driven and atheistic is free from the convictions and preconceived 
notions put forward by particular confessions. In this sense he is able to live in the world as he 
likes; taking what is wanted or needed in the continuous consumptive cycle that is his life. He is 
happy to pursue his desires, and though he very much enjoys this existence, we cannot say that 
he is free. The individual is stuck, trapped in the consumptive cycle that accompanies his self 
identification, his point of view, and ultimately his egoism. If left to his own devices, the 
atheistic individual would in fact live a happy, yet selfish life, one we could call unfulfilled. It is 
only with the revelation of Alterity, i.e. the appearance of the absolute Other, that the ego can 
choose to break his consumptive cycle of egoistic desires and begin serving the other. A blind 
obedience to one’s instincts in order to satisfy his needs does not speak of freedom; the latter 
requires a call that forces the subject to choose between two options, a command that orders 
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obedience but also opens the possibility of being rejected. In other words, there can be no 
freedom without the Other who calls into question my egoism, that is, there can be no freedom 
without ethics.21 
 With the atheistic individual being trapped in his cycle of self identification and egoistic 
desires, what is it about the Other that enables the individual to break free? According to Levinas 
what is presented to the individual upon meeting the Other is a realization of a difference that he 
has not yet experienced in the elemental, a radical difference that challenges the egocentric view 
of the individual. As Levinas writes:  
Its critical intention then leads it beyond theory and ontology: critique does not reduce 
the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the exercise of the same. A 
calling into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoistic spontaneity of 
the same—is brought about by the other.22 
 
For the individual, the Other presents the first instance of criticism (“remise-en-question”, in 
French) where the individual is put into question. A critique which stems from the Other toward 
the individual effectively questioning and judging his actions and his appropriation of the world 
which had been hitherto unchecked. Suddenly, the world is no longer mine alone; an Other 
emerges who begins to question my appropriation, my hegemony. And it is here that the 
individual realizes the notion of difference, a possible perspective that exists outside of the realm 
of the individual. To put this in the simplest terms: when the individual comes to meet another 
person he is in turn made to question what it is that he does and also what it is that the other 
person does, because for the first time in his egoistic life he is faced with something that he does 
not immediately understand; something wholly other than himself that can no longer be 
                                                 
21 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 83-84. 
22 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43. 
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consumed. The individual encounters a Stranger whom he cannot know, assimilate, understand, 
comprehend. Whatever authority he had in the elemental suddenly disintegrates before a 
presence that eludes his grasp and his control. With the Other, the individual finds for the first 
time, something not simply given, but rather something that is wholly different from him, to his 
perspective, and his wants. Levinas writes:  
Neither possession nor the unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the 
Stranger [l'Étranger], the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself [le chez 
moi]. But Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power. He escapes my 
grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. He is not wholly in 
my site.23 
 
The Other or the Stranger as posited by Levinas, awakens the individual to a perspective that is 
wholly different to his own, thus breaking the individual from his cycle of self identification and 
desire. It is this break that allows the questioning of the individual's constant egoistic drives, 
revealing to him that the world is not wholly familiar and essentially demonstrating a limitation 
of the individual through the recognition of his inability to completely possess and control. This 
must be the case, for the individual prior to this realization is one who knows only the mastery he 
has over the familiar world. In recognizing difference the individual is able to consider the 
opposite of mastery, namely, frailty or weakness. As Levinas writes:  
Frailty does not here figure the inferior degree of any attribute, the relative deficiency of 
the determination common to me and the other. Prior to the manifestation of attributes, it 
qualifies alterity itself.24 
 
It is therefore an other who brings about the realization of a life that is not self-sufficient, 
a life marked by a presence that cannot be mastered despite its vulnerability, indeed because of it. 
                                                 
23 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39. 
24 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 256. 
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Here we find the breeding ground within the individual for an idea that what he does has an 
effect that extends outside his familiar world, ultimately upon those outside himself. With this 
the individual is made aware of the weight of responsibility that accompanies his actions. As 
Levinas writes: "a calling into question of the same – which cannot occur within the egoism of 
the same – is brought about by the other".25 This happens through the realization of Alterity, an 
idea of a point of view that is not of the ego, but of the Other. From this it becomes apparent that 
the introduction of an other brings the individual to doubt his actions. It is at this point that the 
individual has for the first time an opportunity to be free, as the ego is now faced with an option: 
either recognize and take responsibility for his actions in the face of the Other or ignore his call 
altogether.  He is thus free to reject the call, but cannot preclude it, that is, cannot deny that there 
has been a call in the first place. 
 While the account given above regarding the sheer necessity of difference may 
demonstrate the importance the Other has to our freedom, it begs the question of how another 
person can bring about the realization of difference within us. For Levinas, it is the face, or more 
precisely it is the face-to-face encounter with the other person that allows the individual to 
consider the ethical responsibility that he has to that person. When the individual is presented 
with the face of the Other it is recognizable, but according to Levinas, it is ultimately elusive. 
The individual does not know based on the face what the consequences of his actions are. The 
face of the Other for Levinas represents an encounter altogether separate to that of the 
consumptive nature of the individual in that it is without capability. The face challenges the 
inherent ability of the individual in that it wholly escapes subjectivity. This means that the face 
with its own expressions outwardly represents a defiance to the consuming nature of the egoism 
                                                 
25 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 43. 
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of the individual. No matter what the individual wants, the face stands opposed expressing its 
own judgments upon that of the individual. Nothing of the face is hidden from the individual; it 
is therefore naked to him, entirely vulnerable and bearing no consequences, no effects, and no 
reflections of his desires. As Levinas writes: 
Such a nudity is the face. The nakedness of the face is not what is presented to me 
because I disclose it, what would therefore be presented to me, to my powers, to my 
eyes, to my perceptions, in the light exterior to it. The face has turned to me—and this is 
its very nudity. It is by itself and not by reference to a system.26 
 
It is this nakedness, this frailty as represented by the freedom of the face that, for the 
individual, is overwhelmingly foreign. It is this experience of the face that allows the individual 
to realize that there is a horizon that extends beyond his consumptive cycle and opens him up to 
the notion of Alterity. The individual, unaccustomed to confusion when faced with formal 
difference, is shaken by his own inability to understand or comprehend this absolute difference. 
In turn he is forced to question his egoistic perspective. And for the first time the individual 
doubts his own mastery. With this the atheistic individual is presented with something that goes 
against his desires, questions his actions, and ultimately changes him. In other words, the 
individual comes to recognize ethics and in turn the possibility of God. As Levinas writes:  
The dimension of the divine opens forth from the human face. Relation with the 
Transcendent free from all captivation by the Transcendent is a social relation. It is here 
that the Transcendent, infinitely other, solicits us and appeals to us. The proximity of the 
Other, the proximity of the neighbour, is in being an ineluctable moment of the 
revelation of an absolute presence (that is, disengaged from every relation), which 
expresses itself.27 
 
                                                 
26 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 74. 
27 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78. 
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Levinas here is making a connection between the Alterity that is recognized by the individual 
through his encounter with the Other and the absolute concept of Alterity that is represented by 
God. This is further solidified when we consider what Levinas said in a 1986 interview: "There 
are these two strange things in the face: its extreme frailty—the fact of being without means and, 
on the other hand, there is authority. It is as if God spoke through the face".28 The confusion and 
mystery that is presented by the face of an other is representative of the confusion and mystery 
that is associated with the absolute Other, i.e. God, the source of Otherness in general. Levinas 
writes:  
His [God's] very epiphany consists in soliciting us by his destitution in the face of the 
Stranger, the widow, and the orphan. The atheism of the metaphysician means, 
positively, that our relation with the Metaphysical is an ethical behaviour and not 
theology, not a thematization, be it a knowledge by analogy, of the attributes of God.29 
 
The face-to-face encounter between the individual and an other demonstrates through analogy 
the undeniable nature of the absolute Other and Otherness in general, meaning that the individual 
experiences through analogy the mystery of the transcendent notion of Otherness in general. We 
can see that from this the individual is forced to come to terms with his own actions as they are 
reflected back at him through the judgmental expressions present in the face to face encounter. It 
stands to reason that because the individual is not privy to the thoughts and feelings of the Other 
he does not know if actions are indeed reasonable in his eyes. This places the Other in a position 
of privilege regarding the judgment of the individual's actions. Therefore, the Other can be seen 
as the ultimate authority, i.e. the basis for concluding the ethical ramifications and in turn the 
justifications of an individual's actions. In this, He informs the individual through analogy of the  
                                                 
28 Wright, Hughes, and Ainley, "The Paradox of Morality," 169. 
29 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 78. 
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an absolute authority, that which stands as the ultimate judge. From this it can be seen that the 
Other not only determines what is right and wrong, but also that there is an ethical right and 
wrong, as found in God. This reading is cemented by Levinas who said: 
The face is not a force. It is an authority. Authority is often without force. Your question 
seems to be based on the idea that God commands and demands. He is extremely 
powerful. If you try not doing what he tells you, he will punish you. That is a very 
recent notion. On the contrary,  the first form, the unforgettable form, in my opinion, is 
that, in the last analysis, he can not do anything at all. He is not a force but an 
authority.30 
 
The face-to-face encounter that is experienced by the individual reveals to him the existence of 
Alterity and allows him to realize the possible existence of the absolute form of Alterity, which is 
God. The introduction of ethics as found in the individual's questioning of his own actions 
accompanies this Alterity, effectively proving to the individual that there is both a right and a 
wrong; a good and an evil. In this encounter the individual is left to decide whether to continue 
with his actions or change them in the face of this newfound authority. It is here that we find the 
revelation of the Other. Unlike Plantinga's account, Levinas does not present an intervening force 
that changes the individual; rather Levinas' account of the face-to-face encounter describes an 
awakening within the individual, but this awakening is not followed by a demand but rather a 
command. For the first time, the individual is able to actually choose what it is he wants to do 
after he is faced with an obligation. The individual can very well ignore the face of the other, but 
in doing so he remains aware of the existence of a perspective that differs from his own and the 
effect that his actions could have when looked at through this point of view. As Levinas writes:  
                                                 
30 The specific question being answered by Levinas here is: “Is the face a simple or a complex phenomenon? Would 
it be correct to define it as that aspect of a human being which escapes all efforts at comprehension and totalization, 
or are there other characteristics of this phenomenon which must be included in any definition or description of the 
face?” -  Wright, Hughes, and Ainley, "The Paradox of Morality," 169. 
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Reflection can, to be sure, become aware of this face-to-face, but the "unnatural" 
position of reflection is not an accident in the life of consciousness. It involves a calling 
into question of oneself, a critical attitude which is itself produced in face of the other 
and under his authority.31 
 
Since the individual had been hitherto mainly concerned with his own desires, it follows 
that any form of self-reflection or ethical consideration would seem out of the ordinary, foreign, 
or unnatural to him. With this it follows that while he cannot fully ignore the revelation that 
accompanies the face-to-face with the Other, he is able to ignore his judgment. What this means 
is that the individual does not automatically believe in God and adhere to the Scriptures. Levinas' 
subject sees God's authority through the Other and is deeply unsettled by it. This distress 
awakens the individual to the Other’s infinity or transcendence and, through him, to his absolute 
obligation, but in a way that he can subsequently reject his duty. The individual can look at an 
other person, see that there is something different, something outside of himself, something 
which transcends him, and just shrug it off. The individual can do what is right and recognize his 
ethical responsibilities to others or he can go so far to the opposite as to kill the other person. Not 
murdering is an absolute prescription only because it is possible in the first place. What cannot 
be denied is the transcendent authority of the command made infinite by the very nudity of the 
face.  
What is so striking about Levinas' account of the individual and his analogous revelation 
of God's existence is how superfluous God's existence seems to be. If the individual is free to act 
as he sees fit then why do we need God in this at all? This question is an important one as it 
reveals the mentality that has been spread by a certain view of God. For Levinas, God is not a 
guardian who steps in when you are in trouble, nor is he a controller who determines the 
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outcome; rather Levinas presents a God who is only present in this world through the Other, 
which is why the only access to him is through ethics. God grounds justice in both the practical 
and conceptual forms of it. As Levinas writes:  
To place oneself under the judgement of God is to exalt the subjectivity, called to moral 
overstepping beyond laws, which is henceforth in truth because it surpasses the limits of 
its being. The judgement of God that judges me at the same time confirms me. But it 
confirms me precisely in my interiority, whose justice is more severe than the judgement 
of history.32 
 
Levinas here is stating that when the individual recognizes God through his encounters with the 
Other he is able to behave in accordance with an absolute form of ethics, meaning that the 
individual is not merely doing what is right according to the laws of the land or in accordance with 
some political system; rather he is able to do what is universally right. In opening himself up to this 
sort of gaze, the individual is able to question the effects of his actions and in turn his subjectivity 
is reinforced.  
The Reversal  
 While the above may explain the face to face encounter with the Other and the ethical 
responsibility that it brings, a question remains of why exactly an individual is meant to act upon 
this responsibility. What motivates the individual to choose to act ethically?  The nakedness of the 
face may reveal or draw an individual towards his ethical responsibility, but this in no way 
accounts for why he ought to act in accordance with said responsibility. The individual for the first 
time is free to choose to act against his own desire so what exactly adheres him to the ethical? 
Now, this is not a question of action per se, but rather is a question of ability. Up to this point, the 
individual is merely an amalgam of desires and  is made aware of his own actions through 
                                                 
32 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 246 
  Page 27 of 64 
 
judgement. This does not remove the individual’s proclivity to desire or consume instead, 
according to Levinas, the desire of the individual meets a reversal of terms. To fully grasp this 
concept we must first recognize that the ethical responsibility the individual is made aware of 
and in turn the potential results of his own actions are in fact forms of desire. And while the 
individual is familiar with his selfish desire for himself, the encounter with the Other awakens a 
new spectrum of desire by reversing its focus. While the individual usually wants for himself, 
this new desire wants for another. In other words, the face to face encounter with the Other takes 
the individual’s desire and shifts it from one that is not for oneself, such as a need or a want, to 
one that is from oneself as a result of self reflection. This becomes evident when we consider  
Levinas’ work “God and Philosophy’ where Levinas writes:      
But this desire is of another order than the desires involved in hedonist or eudaemonist 
affectivity and activity, where the desirable is invested, reached, and identified as an 
object of need, and where the immanence of representation and of the exterior world is 
restored. The negativity of the in of the Infinite - otherwise than being, divine comedy - 
hollows out a desire which cannot be filled, nourishes itself with its very augmentation, 
and is exalted as a desire, withdraws from its satisfaction in the measure that it 
approaches the desirable. It is a desire that is beyond satisfaction, and, unlike a need, 
does not identify a term or an end. This endless desire for what is beyond being is dis-
interestedness - transcendence - desire for the Good.33 
 
The desire of the individual normally revolves around himself. They are selfish needs and wants 
which are directed at his own happiness. In the face of the Other the individual is marked by an 
encounter that exposes him to the notion of Alterity, to an absolute Otherness which extends 
beyond his grasp. It stands to reason that the responsibility that is connected to this encounter 
also extends past the ability and understanding of the individual. In turn, the desire to act in 
                                                 
33 Levinas, Emmanuel. “God and Philosophy”, Collected Philosophical Papers. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987, 163.  
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response to the proceeding judgment of the Other is one that falls outside the scope of terrestrial 
desires. This is what is meant by “a desire that is beyond satisfaction”, as the want to act justly is 
a want which has no end. It is a way of wanting rather than a singular want34. This marks the 
complete reversal of terms for the individual in that desire takes on a new meaning, it becomes 
desire from the individual expressed in the way of his actions rather than desire for the individual 
gained from his actions.     
 Acting in accordance with the absolute authority of the Other occurs as a result of the 
reversal of the individual’s wants. This reversal is the inescapable result of the command of the 
Other. As was mentioned in the previous section, the individual is still able to ignore this 
command and act unjustly, though in doing so he does not remove this new found desire. What 
this means is that the freedom of the individual to choose his actions does not resolve the 
intentionality of said actions. The individual’s desire is transcendent in this sense, it is beyond 
fulfillment and marks an awareness of a permanent change of state. As Levinas writes: 
This wakefulness or openness to oneself is completely exposed, and sobered up from the 
ecstasy of intentionality. We have designated this way for the Infinite, or for God, to 
refer, from the heart of its very desirability, to the non-desirable proximity of others, by 
the term "illeity"; it is the extraordinary reversal of the desirability of the desirable, the 
supreme desirability, calling to itself the rectilinear straightforwardness of desire. 
Through this reversal the desirable escapes desire.35 
 
This notion of illeity does not directly represent the actual mechanism of Levinas’ reversal of 
terms, meaning that the individual does not see himself in the Other. He does not shift his wants 
because his notion of self shifts, nor does the individual act in favour of the Other for his own 
self interest. The use of the word illeity is not literal within this section of Levinas, rather it is 
                                                 
34This interpretation is reenforced by Levinas when he writes: “He does not fill me up with goods, but compels me 
to goodness, which is better than goods received.” Levinas, Emmanuel. “God and Philosophy”, pg. 165.  
35 Levinas, Emmanuel. “God and Philosophy”. pg. 165. 
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meant to invoke the concept of the third person, the beyond oneself and objects. In other words, 
illeity is meant to represent the acknowledgment of the possibility of something that transcends 
the self, that awakens the individual to a desire beyond selfishness through the reversal of his 
desire towards the transcendent desire of the Other, namely the ethically good. This is what is 
meant in the above quote, that the individual sees another first as an object, then in the face to 
face encounters the Other and in turn is awoken to Otherness in general (i.e. Alterity, the 
possibility of God, and ethics). This awakening is illeity, the recognition of absolute difference 
that results in a surrender of egoism. As Levinas writes in “Phenomenon and Enigma”:  
Desire, or the response to an enigma, or morality, is a plot with three personages: the I 
approaches the infinite by going generously toward the you, who is still my contemporary, 
but, in the trace of illeity, presents himself out of a depth of the past, faces, and approaches 
me. I approach the infinite insofar as I forget myself for my neighbor who looks at me; I 
forget myself only in breaking the undephasable simultaneity of representation, in existing 
beyond my death. I approach the infinite by sacrificing myself. 36 
 
The individual is awoken from his harmonious egoistic point of view and is made to realize the 
transcendence of the Alterity through the ethical.  
 After considering the above, we are given an answer to why the individual ought to choose 
the ethical when in a face to face encounter with the Other. Simply put, the individual through 
illeity and the reversal of the terms of desire should want to choose to act in accordance with 
ethics. The individual should encounter the Other and be changed, in turn moving away from his 
selfish wants towards the good that comes from the ethical. Speaking practically, we can only say 
that this should happen. Granted all individuals go through this awakening if they encounter the 
Other in a face to face, though that doesn’t mean that they must or even do choose ethics. Ethics 
and in turn freedom, for Levinas, remains an incredibly difficult choice. While the individual is 
                                                 
36 Levinas, Emmanuel. “Phenomena and Enigma,” Collected Philosophical Papers. Translated by Alphonso Lingis. 
Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987. pg. 72.  
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made aware of this new form of desire he must still overcome his selfishness in order to fulfill his 
ethical responsibilities. This would seem like an impossible task for someone who has never 
experienced anything outside of his ego before, though after we consider the role of the Feminine 
and the preconditioning that she provides for the individual in the next chapter we will see that the 
reversal as well as the ethical responsibility that accompanies it will seem less daunting.  
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Chapter Two: A New Definition of Faith 
The Feminine 
 The most salient aspect of Levinas' account of the individual's revelation of God’s 
command behind the encounter with the Other, is that in no way does the individual require faith 
to analogously see and in turn be judged by God. In the actual moment that the individual meets 
the Other face to face, the notion of Oherness is thrust upon him and, according to Levinas, the 
individual has no choice; he is struck by the infinity of the Other who now confronts him. Faith 
is simply not involved in this encounter. Beliefs are not required to make this revelation occur, 
nor is the change that happens within the individual sustained by it. If faith as a belief or as a 
type of belief is not necessary to an individual’s revelation, then it must be the case that faith 
exists outside of simply holding a belief in something. With this we are left wondering what 
exactly faith is within Levinas' account and if it is even needed by the individual? Granted we 
saw in the last chapter that the individual has no choice but to recognize infinite difference and 
the transcendent notion of complete Alterity that accompanies it. Though if this is the case, how 
is it possible? Up to this point Levinas has made it clear that the individual is wrapped up in his 
consumptive cycle of self identification, so how is it possible for him to recognize something that 
exists outside of it and is so great that it exceeds its comprehension? In other words, how is the 
finite able to recognize the infinite? It seems hard to believe that the individual would be able to 
simply abandon his egoistic nature and view the Other as absolute difference, let alone recognize 
it as a source of ethical authority. This reading is cemented by Levinas when he writes: 
How would a total reflection be allowed a being that never becomes the bare fact of 
existing, and whose existence is life, that is, life from something? How in the midst of a 
life which is from...which enjoys elements, and which is preoccupied with overcoming 
the insecurity of enjoyment, is the distance to be produced?37 
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Here Levinas recognizes the difficulty that is presented to the individual, suggesting that it is in 
fact too much to ask of the individual to just abandon himself by separating himself from his 
desires while in the face of the Other. This aspect of Levinas’ work highlights the need for faith 
as a preparatory condition of the individual that would allow him to recognize and in turn be able 
to welcome future encounters with others thus facilitating the individual’s acceptance of Alterity 
and ultimately God. The aim of this chapter will be to show that faith as a preparatory 
mechanism arises inherently within the individual as a result of emotional and physical yearning. 
I will show that through his encounters with the Feminine, the individual – as a result of what 
Levinas refers to as the “original call for aid” – is conditioned to look to something else as a 
source of safety and comfort. From this I will show that faith for Levinas is a result of our 
longing for a return to the safety that is brought about by the Feminine and is expressed by the 
individual as an outwardly directed hope. Ultimately, this chapter will show that faith arises from 
the conditioned hope of the individual which allows him to be both receptive and conditioned to 
take part in the unselfish act of introspection when faced with an other. 
 The key to defining the mechanism of faith within Levinas’ work stems from the dense 
and somewhat illusive notion of the Feminine Alterity. As mentioned earlier, Levinas offers a 
separate aspectual view of the world in which two aspects, that of the transcendent and that of 
the familiar, are ultimately made available to the individual through revelation and egoism. This 
twofold perspective is carried forward when discussing Alterity. To this point, the individual 
when faced with the Other sees through his eyes the very height of God himself. This Other 
belongs to the transcendent and must be considered totally separate from the familiar world. The 
Other in this sense is absolute Alterity. The Feminine Alterity, on the other hand, while still 
technically different, is not wholly transcendent and her encounter does not produce the 
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revelation necessary for freedom through ethics. In this sense the Feminine is not wholly outside 
of the familiar, nor is she completely within it. This suggests that the Feminine Alterity 
represents a different aspect of Otherness to that of the absolute Other found in the face to face 
encounter. This model is echoed in an interview, when Levinas answers a question on gender by 
stating: 
allusions to the ontological differences between the masculine and the Feminine would 
appear less archaic if, instead of dividing humanity into two species (or two genders), 
they would signify that the participation in the masculine and in the Feminine were the 
attribute of every human being.38 
 
From this it is fair to presume that Levinas’ notion of Alterity embodies this aspectual divide 
suggesting that Alterity is not only broken up into different aspects for the individual, but that 
this Alterity is not characterized by a single gender. This notion is reinforced by Tina Chanter in 
her essay “Feminism and the Other” when she offers a somewhat opaque definition of the 
Feminine, stating that Levinas “identifies the Feminine as the equivocal, recognizes that it is 
what it is not”.39 Chanter here touches on a very important notion regarding the Feminine within 
Levinas in that it is a non-binary concept. What this means is that the common cis-gendered 
description of the sexes is irrelevant to an examination of the Feminine in Levinas. When 
Levinas writes of the Feminine he is not writing about women per se, as the former cannot be 
seen as a category. In this regard, it would make just as little sense to identify absolute Alterity 
with the category of the masculine or rather, with men. The face has no physical traits that make 
it recognizable as a specific gender or race for that matter. As such we can see that the Feminine 
within Levinas takes hold in an area void of gendered description. This must be the case for if the 
Feminine is meant to shift from the familiar to the transcendent then to have a gender or to 
                                                 
38 Tina Chanter, "Feminism and the Other" in The Provocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other, ed. Robert 
Bernasconi and David Wood (London: Routledge, 1988), 47 
39 Chanter, "Feminism and the Other," 51 
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belong as an aspect of only a single category would inhibit the transitory nature of the Feminine 
that Levinas is trying to convey. Therefore the gendered pronouns used going forward when 
discussing the Feminine are merely for simplicity’s sake and do not speak of choosing between 
men or women.40 
 Now, the equivocal nature of the Feminine that Chanter points out does not stop at the 
issue of gender. As an aspect of Alterity that spans the gap between the transcendent and the 
familiar, it stands to reason that the Feminine will not easily fit into any given description. This 
becomes apparent when we consider that the Feminine for Levinas is not classifiable as a being, 
but rather is a way of being; a category of being that is created and sustained by the individual 
within the individual:   
I am thus describing a category that falls neither into the being–nothing opposition, nor 
into the notion of the existent. It is an event in existing different from the hypostasis by 
which an existent arises. The existing is accomplished by the “subjective” and in 
“consciousness”; alterity here is accomplished in the Feminine. This term is on the same 
level as, but in meaning opposed to, consciousness. The Feminine is not accomplished 
as a being in a transcendence toward light, but in modesty.41 
 
Here we are presented with the most difficult and also the most important aspect of Levinas’ 
notion of the Feminine difference in that the Feminine is neither a thing nor an object. We cannot 
point to the Feminine, nor can we distill it down into its parts. To the contrary, the Feminine is a 
way of being for the individual that reveals an element of Alterity within an object. Just as when 
a man falls in love there is no causal evidence that can be traced back to that which he loves. He 
                                                 
40 It is important to note that while Levinas does assert, that the Feminine Alterity is not a reference to a gendered 
notion or concept, he to falls into the habit of conflating the Feminine with the linguistic standards of gender. As we 
will see later in this thesis, Levinas refers to the Feminine as “the Woman” and in many cases will fall back into 
gendered pronouns. I am also guilty of this in this thesis, though I attempt to clarify the non-gendered basis of the 
Feminine, it is virtually not possible to discuss the topic without falling back into the comforts of our gendered 
language. This does not represent a weakness within Levinas’ works rather, I feel that it demonstrates two rather 
fundamental failings that Levinas’ works bring to light, namely, a limitation of the English language and the 
proclivity towards objectification of the individual. While the prior failing of language has been addressed in the 
passage above, the later will be discussed in the “Final Thoughts” section of this thesis.  
41 Levinas, Time & The Other, 88.  
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cannot build a loved one. He cannot distill her down into her parts because without “her” 
(without that aspect of Otherness, that Feminine Alterity) she is merely another object. The 
Feminine in this sense cannot be known outside of its effect, namely, the ability to change the 
egoism of the individual from a consumptive force to a protective one. This becomes evident 
when we consider that “the Feminine is not accomplished as a being in a transcendence toward 
light, but in modesty”.42 From this it is clear that the role of the Feminine or rather the effect that 
the Feminine has on the individual is a product of modesty. This is not modesty in the sense of 
shyness or humility, but rather marks a modesty of its encounter. The individual is not drawn out 
is his egoism when he encounters the Feminine as this would mark a complete change of the 
individual. Due to the modesty of the Feminine the individual is not left completely changed as 
with the reversal that stems from his encounter with the Other. Though this does not mean that  
something similar to the complete reversal of terms does not occur.  
The Feminine Reversal 
 As was mentioned in the previous chapter, the face to face encounter through illeity 
awakens the individual to a new form of desire, namely, a desire which stems from oneself 
towards the good as opposed to a desire for oneself. This marks a complete reversal of the terms 
of desire focusing the individual towards the transcendence of the Good which stems from the 
individual awakening to the absolute Alterity of Otherness in general. Now, the Feminine does 
not present an absolute Alterity. The dual aspectual nature of the Feminine represents a modesty 
in her encounters with the individual and therefore a complete reversal of the terms of desire is 
not possible within such a modest encounter. Though when we consider that this encounter no 
less represents the individual’s first brush with Alterity it becomes apparent that something of a 
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change within the individual does occur. We are not presented with a complete reversal of terms; 
instead the individual undergoes a pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire. This reversal is not a 
matter of action, but instead relates to ability. To this point the individual only wants for himself 
and in turn his ability to desire represents a truncated testament to his consumptive egoistic 
nature. From this it is fair to say that the individual does not have the capacity or ability to desire 
in any other way. That is, until he encounters the Feminine. This becomes evident when we 
consider that the Feminine is a different aspect of Alterity meaning that she is both transcendent 
and familiar. In other words, she can be desired, but she can never truly be claimed and 
consumed. It follows then that when the Feminine is realized within the individual he is for the 
first time presented with an object that in someway transcends his grasp. He is not able to 
consume the Feminine and in turn is woken to a new form of desire. A desire that, like the 
Feminine, straddles the familiar and the transcendent.  
 From the above examination we see the pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire which 
come about from the modesty of the Feminine namely, the desire to have rather than to consume.  
This, of course, is still a familiar selfish desire, though it is no longer a desire to consume (i.e. to 
bring completely into his ownership); rather it is a desire to preserve. This reading is given a 
solid foundation when we consider what is meant by Levinas when he speaks of one of the key 
elements of the Feminine namely, fecundity or the ability to reproduce. As Levinas writes:  
The “transcendence of fecundity” does not have the structure of intentionality, does not 
reside in the powers of the I, for the alterity of the Feminine is associated with it; the 
erotic subjectivity is constituted within the common act of the sensing and the sensed 
that is the self of an other, accordingly is constituted within a relation with the other, 
within relation with the face.43 
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With this the notion of preservation over consumption becomes clear as the individual when 
encountering the Feminine is presented with an aspect of transcendence that is found in the 
aspectual nature of the Feminine Alterity. This represents a relation with an other rather than the 
true and disturbing face to face encounter. In this the Feminine can be seen as a gentle encounter 
which leaves the individual intact and secure in his egoism. To this end the individual is also 
presented with a literal form of illeity where by the Feminine awakens within the individual a 
desire to procreate. This draws the individual’s wants towards a literal third person, a child for 
which he can protect and who will serve as his continuation. In turn, we see that the encounter 
with the Feminine Alterity mirrors that of the encounter with the Other, though does so with a 
gentleness and security that does not rip the individual from himself, but instead offers a pseudo-
reversal of the subjective terms of his desires:   
The movement here is thus inverse. The transcendence of the Feminine consists in 
withdrawing elsewhere, which is a movement opposed to the movement of 
consciousness. But this does not make it unconscious or subconscious, and I see no 
other possibility than to call it mystery.44 
 
The inversion that Levinas writes of is the internal change that occurs within the desires of the 
individual. When he encounters the Feminine, the individual withdraws from his egoistically 
driven consumptive cycle. He is instead moved to soften his way of wanting which results from 
the gentle modesty of his encounter with the Feminine. This shift in his ability to desire is an 
internal one in that it stems from the subjective nature of the individual through the mediation 
provided by the Feminine. It is not wholly caused by the Feminine, but rather by her interaction 
with the individual. In essence, the Feminine Alterity awakens a new form of desire within the 
individual, a desire that is deeply connected to the metaphysical. 
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Metaphysical Desire  
 The egoism of the individual predisposes him to see his own personal desires as the 
horizon of his existence. In this state the individual is naturally a solitary being who does not 
have the ability to recognize anything outside of his wants. To this end, he is happy to want and 
take as he sees fit. This is what it means to live the life of an atheist, a life whose goal is to 
ultimately reinforce the ego. It is right to say that this all changes when the individual encounters 
the Feminine: though it does not occur through a revelatory moment, the change still comes 
about through the subtleties of her presence. The individual still wants, but the desire that is 
produced by this encounter is one of preservation. It is a desire to be with something rather than 
to consume it. In other words, it is a desire for companionship. This represents a shift in the 
wants of the individual and in turn a shift in his overall outlook on the world. He is no longer 
happy to be alone in his personal satisfaction and instead he is given the ability to realize a desire 
greater than himself, a desire not just for the Feminine, but for her Alterity. This desire is known 
within Levinas as metaphysical desire namely, a desire that aims at something it cannot reach: 
not just difference, but absolute difference. As Levinas writes:  
The metaphysical desire has another intention; it desires beyond everything that can 
simply complete it. It is like goodness – the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it. It 
is a generosity nourished by the Desired, and thus a relationship that is not the 
disappearance of distance, not a bringing together [...] Desire is absolute if the desiring 
being is mortal and the Desired invisible. Invisibility does not denote an absence of 
relation; it implies relations with what is not given, of which there is no idea.45                   
 
The encounter with the Feminine Alterity shifts the desire of the individual whereby the 
individual no longer merely wants an object, rather he wants preservation and continuation 
through companionship. The individual cannot actually ever have the Feminine, as her equivocal 
nature prevents it. This metaphysical desire is precisely the reason why, for Levinas, the desire 
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for the Feminine cannot be objectively attributed to the object of an individual’s affection. It is a 
desire for that which escapes objectification. This is made evident by Chanter who writes of the 
nature of the Feminine relationship with the individual: 
It is not that one exists without the other, in the relation of love. Rather, Levinas is 
pointing to a fundamental ambiguity; the relation between lovers is characterized by 
femininity. It goes toward infinity while at the same time it is marked by a return to 
self.46 
 
 With the above Chanter demonstrates the specific type of want depicted by Levinas’ individual. 
It is a want for an illeity that is driven by the egoism of the individual. It is a desire to have and 
to hold rather than the individual’s familiar consumptive drive. From the above we can see that 
by wanting in this way the individual can rightly be seen as wanting and therefore is not fully 
drawn out of his egoism. Instead his wants are given a new depth by the Feminine thus allowing 
for companionship, love, and a less shallow form of joy.  
 With this said it is important to note that the metaphysical desire of the individual for the 
Feminine is separate from that of the metaphysical desire that presents in the face to face 
encounter with the Other. While both encounters represent a reversal of the terms of desire for 
the individual each reversal awakens a different form of metaphysical desire. As was discussed in 
the previous section the Feminine transcendence represents a gentle awakening and a pseudo-
reversal of the terms of desire. In this sense, the metaphysical desire it instills is still deeply 
rooted in the subjectivity of the individual. He is drawn to the gentleness and security of her 
Alterity while the encounter with the Other offers a complete separation from security by 
shaking the individual from his own wants in favour of ethical responsibility.   
 
The Feminine & Her Language 
 While above we have offered a brief description of what the Feminine is within Levinas 
and the desire that she awakens within the individual, we are left with the task of understanding 
                                                 
46 Chanter, "Feminism and the Other," 44. 
  Page 40 of 64 
 
how it functions so that we can demonstrate how faith is derived from it. To do this we must 
consider language within Levinas. In the previous chapter it was mentioned that the face-to-face 
encounter with the other presents the subject with the first instance of choice and a way of 
breaking free from his egoistic cycle through ethics. If the individual accepts the revelatory 
moment presented within the face-to-face encounter then he takes on an ethical responsibility for 
the said other. The first step of this responsibility for Levinas is language. As Levinas writes, 
"the very fact of being in a conversation consists in recognizing in the Other a right over this 
egoism and hence in justifying oneself".47 Levinas here paints a picture of conversation as being 
a non-egoistic act, an act that occurs in lieu of the egoism of the individual. This is to say that 
while the individual is deeply entrenched in his ego, deep in the throes of fulfilling his wants and 
desires he is struck with ethical doubt. In turn the individual speaks in an attempt to justify his 
actions and essentially accepts his ethical responsibility. The simple act of conversation therefore 
represents a break from the egoistic cycle of the individual in favour of an other. As Levinas 
writes: 
The relation between the same and the other, metaphysics, is primordially enacted as 
conversation, where the same, gathered up in its ipseity as an "I", as a particular existent 
unique and autochthonous, leaves itself.48 
 
From this we can see that speaking, no matter the content, is a break from one’s own egoism in 
that it requires the individual to abandon his own wants in order to allow for a response.49 This 
response is nothing more than an affirmation that arrives from a perspective that is outside of the 
individual and his ego. In this sense all conversation is a form of apology or, in other words, it is 
an acceptance of our personal ethical responsibility. There is a chance that the individual’s 
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actions could be deemed unjustifiable or justified and from this possibility it can be seen that 
simply engaging in conversation acts as an implicit acceptance of either outcome. Levinas goes 
on to further define the use of speech between the individual and the other when he writes:  
Speech proceeds from absolute difference. Or, more exactly, an absolute difference is 
not produced in the process of specification descending from genus to species, in which 
the order of logical relations runs up against the given, which is not reducible to 
relations. The difference thus encountered remains bound up with the logical hierarchy 
contrast with, and appears against the ground of the common genus. Absolute 
difference, inconceivable in terms of formal logic, is established only by language. 
 
Language then is not only how the individual is able to communicate with the Other, but it is 
what establishes its Otherness. It is a way to share the world with one another, but in a way that 
keeps the self and the Other separate; when the individual speaks he is essentially acknowledging 
that the other is not objectifiable, it confirms that he is not Him. In this sense, language upholds 
and justifies the separation that marks the face-to-face interaction.  
 This language and its subsequent relationship to the interactions of the individual that 
Levinas writes of does not wholly apply to the notion of the Feminine. As the Feminine Alterity 
represents a different aspect of Alterity from that of the absolute Other it makes sense that the 
language associated with it would also be of a different nature. And it is in this communicative 
difference between the Other and the Feminine that we are able to fully grasp exactly how the 
Feminine is able to function within Levinas’ work. Levinas writes about the language of the 
Feminine in his section on dwelling, stating that the Feminine “is situated on another plane than 
language and nowise represents a truncated, stammering, still elementary language”.50 From this 
brief explanation it would be understandable to take the Feminine language as meaning a 
physical or sexual language. And while the physical nature of this language cannot be denied, 
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relegating the Feminine language to this domain does an injustice as it ignores the subtleties and 
power that Levinas is attempting to convey. When we consider what the Feminine does to 
individual (i.e. shifting his egoism into modesty) it seems unlikely that a strictly physical 
language will encompass the depth of this encounter and its effects. The Feminine language is 
more complex than mere physical interaction, it is one of the mind and the body. It is a mixture 
of intellect, physicality, and emotion. This interpretation is justified when we consider what 
Levinas writes of the Feminine in relation to eros: 
Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine – at the same time interlocutor, 
collaborator and master superiorly intelligent […] The face, all straightforwardness and 
frankness, in its Feminine epiphany dissimulates allusions, innuendos. Its laughs under 
the cloak of its own expression, without leading to any specific meaning, hinting in the 
empty air, signalling the less than nothing.51 
 
Here we see that Levinas presents the Feminine as an other who communicates without a spoken 
language, whose encounters with the individual are marked by a dialogue that is not verbal but 
hidden. Now, there is nothing modest or hidden about the physical. There is nothing hidden in 
our grasp or as Levinas writes:  
If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, 
knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power. Furthermore, the relationship with the 
other is generally sought out as a fusion. I have precisely wanted to contest the idea that 
the relationship with the other is fusion.52 
 
For this reason the language of the Feminine must stem from something more than the physical. 
If this is the case then the language of the Feminine must be rooted in emotion. Meaning that the 
Feminine communicates to the individual through an intimate and personal form of desire, 
namely, gentleness, love, and eros (lust). This reading is backed by what Tina Chanter alludes to 
regarding Levinas’ concept of the Feminine: 
                                                 
51 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 264. [...] added by me in order to maintain clarity. 
52 Levinas, Time & The Other, 90.  
  Page 43 of 64 
 
To put this another way, the feminine has a language, but it is a silent language. That is 
the language of love. Associated with the relation of love is the movement of eros, a 
movement which takes place both as voluptuosity and as fecundity. It is in the difference 
between these two planes, voluptuosity on the one hand, and fecundity on the other, that 
the equivocation of the Feminine is produced.53  
 
Chanter here is directly linking the encounters of the Feminine and the individual with a silent 
communication grounded in human emotion, stating that the very definition of the Feminine is 
found in the individual’s inability to decide how he wants her. He wants to caress her, yet protect 
her. This “language of love” is nothing more than an emotional communication, a 
communication that is catalyzed within the individual and subsequently sustained through the 
pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire. To put this differently, the individual recognizes the 
Feminine Alterity through a medium that is familiar to him, namely, desire, though the desire that 
is communicated to him by the Feminine is of a different sort in that it relies on relation. This 
means that, as a way of being that mediates the egoism of the individual, the Feminine’s 
characteristics are dependent on the individual. In this sense the recognition of the Feminine is 
personal and specific to the individual. The qualities which denote her desirability are subjective 
and in turn act as an internal catalysis for change rather than being an objectively universal 
quality. It is something felt rather than attributed. For this reason the language of the Feminine is 
rightly called a mystery.  
 This mysterious language through which the Feminine is communicated acts as a 
mediation between personal needs and the metaphysical desire – or connects the life of egoism 
with post-Revelation existence – in that the Feminine invites desire but does not accept 
consumption; instead, it invites mutual nurturing and protection. This is the result of the 
voluptuosity and fecundity of the Feminine language. As Levinas writes of voluptuousness:  
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Voluptuousness is not a pleasure like others, because it is not solitary like eating or 
drinking – seems to confirm my views on the exceptional role and place of the feminine, 
and on the absence of any fusion in the erotic.54 
 
The Feminine beckons the individual to come hither for affection rather than consumption. It is 
equivocation, as resistance to the appropriating impetus of the individual begins to change. But 
why does this change? Simply put, the individual wants her more than anything. He is already 
familiar with desire and is accustomed to seek it out. For this reason it follows that when faced 
with a different and more intimate form of desire that grips him in both the mind and the body, 
he doesn’t just want it, he needs it and to this end will do anything to get it. It is almost as if we 
were given here a third desire between the desire for personal need and the metaphysical Desire 
for the Other; indeed what we have is a tertium quid, a passageway that connects one experience 
to the Other. When the ego is comforted by the Feminine, he cares for the first time about 
something that is not himself. In turn the Feminine Alterity mediates the egoism of the individual 
through the prescription of emotional precepts. This reading is reinforced by Levinas when 
discussing the individual without the Feminine in an essay regarding the Feminine and Judaism:  
But ‘without woman man knows neither good, nor succour, nor joy, nor blessing, nor 
pardon’. Nothing of what would be required for a soul! Rabbi Joshua ben Levi added: 
‘neither peace nor life’. Nothing which transforms his natural life into ethics, nothing 
which permits living a life, not even the death that one dies for another.55 
 
The role of the Feminine in relation to the selfish subject begins to appear more clearly. 
Without the Feminine, the individual cannot begin to separate himself from his own ego and in 
turn can never be free. With this it seems uncontroversial to state that the encounter with the 
Feminine represents the genesis of emotional understanding for the individual. This means that 
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the pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire brought about by the Feminine Alterity offers a partial 
break from the individual’s egoistic cycle. As Levinas writes: 
It is comprehensible and exercises its function of interiorization only on the ground of 
the full human personality, which, however, in the woman, can be reserved so as to open 
up the dimension of interiority. And this is the new and irreducible possibility, a 
delightful lapse in being, and the source of gentleness in itself.56 
 
While this gentleness (marked by the preservation of the ego) does demonstrate a change within 
the individual, it cannot be called faith, nor can it be considered its source. In the next section we 
will examine the vulnerability of the individual that arises from his encounter with the Feminine 
Alterity, ultimately outlining how the yearning that is produced within the individual brings 
about his faith.  
Beyond the Feminine 
 Above I have shown how the Feminine through the language of love is able to trigger a 
change in the egoism of the individual. The pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire that this 
produces allows the individual to loosen his selfish grasp of the world in order to embrace the 
Feminine. In other words, through the gentleness of the Feminine encounter the individual is able 
to feel a new form of want, a want rooted in preservation, procreation and care over 
consumption. We are now left with an individual forever changed. He now knows of the 
Feminine and the momentary lapse of being that accompanies her. But what happens when the 
Feminine is gone? What happens when the individual is alone again? Levinas gives the answer to 
this question and in turn takes us a step closer to finding a definition of faith within his works 
when he writes of suffering and pain:  
Is not the evil of suffering—extreme passivity, impotence, abandonment and solitude—
also the unassumable and thus the possibility of a half opening, and, more precisely, the 
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possibility that wherever a moan, a cry, a groan or a sigh happen there is the original call 
for aid, for curative help, for help from the other ego whose alterity, whose exteriority 
promises salvation?57 
 
The “original call for aid” that Levinas is describing stems from the suffering of the individual, a 
suffering that revolves around the notion of abandonment. This is rather telling as it insinuates 
two very important things, namely that the suffering individual has already had an encounter 
with the Feminine and that she is the only cure for said suffering. The first insinuation must be 
the case as both solitude and abandonment presuppose a state of companionship or at the very 
least an encounter with an aspect of Alterity. The second, and far more important, insinuation 
that can be drawn from the suffering described above is the idea that for the individual the 
Feminine can cure his suffering. The original call for aid of the individual begs for help from 
“the other ego whose Alterity promises salvation.” It is understandable to read this description 
and assume that Levinas is writing of the absolute Other, as the salvation or revelation that it 
brings through the face-to-face encounter is well established at this point. Though doing so 
would be incorrect. The transcendent Alterity of the absolute Other is not one that promises 
salvation for Levinas; rather it is salvation in that it completely breaks with his egoism and, as a 
result, saves him from a meaningless life of vacuous pursuits by turning him on the path of 
infinite responsibility.  
The Feminine, on the other hand, does not offer this revelatory encounter as the Alterity 
that she contains is merely a fragment, so to speak, of transcendence. In other words, she 
promises transcendence, hints at it and even invites and prepares the self towards it, but does not 
reveal it in full. The individual recognizes the Feminine within an object (person) and in turn is 
changed by her, though not entirely. It is a distinct internal change of the egoism of the 
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individual. For this reason we cannot call the encounter with the Feminine one ‘salvific’, but 
instead must denote it as a promise. This is what Levinas refers to when he writes that the 
Feminine encounter “includes all the possibilities of the transcendent relationship with the 
Other”.58 The Feminine merely represents the possibility for salvation rather than salvation 
proper. Therefore, when we speak of the suffering of the individual and the original call for aid 
that it produces we are speaking of the individual’s need for the Feminine Alterity rather than the 
Alterity of the absolute Other. 
 The encounter with the Feminine Alterity marks a first for the individual in that it is the 
first time that he must consider the well-being of something other than himself and in turn is 
made modest. Granted, he does so in order to obtain the Feminine, but he does still have to 
consider something outside of himself. When the Feminine is removed and the individual is left 
alone to suffer, we are again presented with a first for the individual. It marks the first time that 
the individual looks to another for help. This is made clear by Levinas who writes:  
Suffering is surely a given in consciousness, a certain ‘psychological content’, like the 
lived experience of colour, of sound, of contact, or like any sensation. But in this 
‘content’ itself, it is in-spite-of consciousness, unassumable. It is unassumable and 
‘unassumability’.59 
 
The individual is incapable of handling his suffering alone and further more his suffering is a 
result of being alone. He is trapped in a state of yearning that forces him to look outside himself 
for help. This yearning is nothing more than a deeply intense longing for the Feminine Other.  
Faith & The Home  
 We have now seen how the Feminine through her mysterious language is able to change 
the desires of the individual by way a of pseudo-reversal of the terms of desire. With this the 
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individual is able to look outwardly into the world and consider the well-being of an other 
through his newly found form of desire. This desire for companionship is rooted in love and 
protection rather than his normal consumptive and objectifying behaviour. While the individual 
may ultimately still want the Feminine he more importantly wants to preserve the Feminine for 
himself. This leaves the individual permanently changed. He is now able to consider others as 
somewhat different to himself, as representing an aspect of Alterity that promises or suggests 
transcendence. Now changed, the individual for the first time is susceptible to suffering the pains 
of abandonment and solitude. He is left with the metaphysical desire for the companionship of 
the Feminine and in turn is made to seek it out in what Levinas refers to as the “original call for 
aid”. And it is within this call for aid where we find the definition of faith within Levinas’ works. 
This must be the case, as the original call for aid is the first time that the individual actively seeks 
out Otherness. In other words, it is the first time that an individual, from his own volition, 
abandons his mastery of the world in exchange for a chance at something else, at another 
presence through a different form of desire. With this being the case, I aim to demonstrate in this 
section that faith within Levinas can be defined as an outwardly directed hope. To do this, I will 
unpack the notion of the House and Home within Levinas’ work demonstrating how the Home 
acts as a vehicle for faith through the suffering of the solitary individual. In doing so I aim to not 
only solidify our new definition of faith, but also give further justification and credence to 
Levinas’ descriptions of the Home and its role.  
Before delving further, it seems pertinent to first give a clear distinction between two 
terms that will be used, namely, the House and the Home. The House, within Levinas, is merely 
a shelter where an individual can find safety from the elemental. It becomes a Home when we 
consider two aspects that become associated with the House after it is lived in, namely, self 
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reflection and welcoming. While both of these aspects will be discussed at length in this chapter 
a brief over view will help guide the reading of this section. With this in mind, the individual in 
his Home is able to reflect on his actions and accomplishments through the collection of 
possessions thus reaffirming his egoistic mastery of the world. In turn he not only finds safety, 
but a metaphorical reflection of his self. The Home as a reflection of the ego of the individual 
offers a way to accept others into his life. As the individual, at this point is without the ability to 
shake his own selfish ego and accept anything outside of himself as more than an object to be 
used, the Home acts as both a space for acceptance to take place and a physical representation of 
the acceptance of others in general. In essence, the Home is a physical manifestation of the 
change afforded by the Feminine encounter i.e. the manifestation of caring for others through the 
the newly awakened form of desire within the individual.  
 With the above distinction in mind we will now move forward to an in-depth examination 
of the Home. Chris Harris, in his article “Toward an Understanding of Home: Levinas and The 
New Testament”, gives an account of the House within Levinas that highlights its economic 
resistance to the hostility of the elemental world. As Harris writes:  
 In this sheltered nook [The Home] we can accumulate possessions. We can work on the 
elemental world, on its wood and its stone, and bring the products of our labor home. 
“Labor, possession, economy” are among the articulations of this symbiosis between the 
ego in the world. Levinas uses economy in its original Greek sense of household 
management. The house is my base for managing the world. It is also a place of 
recollection where I can be myself, where “the separated being can...shut itself up in its 
interiority”.60 
 
Taken in a literal sense the House offers protection from the elemental while providing a respite 
from the constant fear and strife that the individual must endure within the world. While this may 
be true, Harris’ interpretation highlights the more subtle aspect of the House as it relates to self 
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maintenance. This comes through in the idea of being shut up within interiority which in 
Levinas’ language refers to one’s own thoughts. With this in mind the House becomes more than 
a simple shelter in which we find security; rather it becomes a place where the individual is 
capable of recollection and, eventually, of welcoming if not care. In other words, the House 
becomes a Home. The individual is capable of developing himself, however egoistically, through 
and by his possessions. He is in turn reminded of his power and mastery over the world. The 
Home then can be seen as not simply being full of things that are not only of use but that act as 
trophies and mementos, further reinforcing his egoism. The individual looks around his Home 
and sees proof of his ability and accomplishments. 
 Harris’ account is apt in pointing out that for Levinas, the notion of the Home runs even 
deeper, acting as a space of comfort and of peace of mind. This is made plain by Levinas who 
writes:  
The recollection necessary for nature to be able to be represented and worked over, for it 
to first take form as the world, is accomplished as the home. Man abides in the world as 
having come to it from a private domain, from being at home with himself, to which at 
each moment he can retire.61 
 
In essence the Home acts as a sort of egoistic center for the individual; the foundation and 
physical justification of his egoism. From this we see that for Levinas the Home is literally the 
materialization of the individual’s egoism. As the Home is so intertwined with the needs of the 
individual he is fundamentally inseparable from it. This notion is echoed in Harris when he 
writes: “There is, then, some attraction toward this egocentric view of Home. But it is a view 
closed in on itself [...]a place to which one keeps returning. There seems no escape from it”.62 
While the individual is happy to live amongst his objects and relishes in the constant reminders 
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of his accomplishments that the Home brings, the truest form of freedom (ethics) is ultimately 
kept from the individual in his sheltered state of dwelling. This of course is only elevated when 
he is face to face with the Other. 
 While the role of the Home in Levinas’ work is unmistakably important it takes on a new 
and interesting dimension when we consider the Home in relation to the Feminine and in turn 
faith. As it stands, the individual within the Home is both protected and happy. He is at the same 
time comforted by his accomplishments and empowered by his mastery of the world in which he 
lives. Though this may be the case, Levinas is quick to point out that the Home is not without 
strife: 
However, the negative moment of this dwelling which determines possession, the 
recollection which draws me out of submergence, is not a simple echo of possession. 
We may not see it in the counterpart of presence to things, as though the possession of 
things, as a presence to them, dialectically contained the withdrawal from them, this 
withdrawal implies a new event; I must have been in relation with something I do not 
live from.63 
 
According to Levinas, the possessions within the Home are akin to trophies collected by the 
individual which reflect his mastery of the world and his ability to transform the elements to his 
will. And while these possessions are ultimately a good thing, they carry with them a twofold 
reminder of what the individual doesn’t have. The first case that Levinas is attempting to 
describe is the insatiable need that results from the egoism of the subject, in that no matter how 
many things the Home contains it is always lacking. The physical desires of the world, however 
fully satisfied by the ego, continually leave him empty and unfulfilled. The individual looks upon 
what he possesses and is made to long for what he does not. In this sense, we are never able to be 
truly satisfied by our possessions. With this the individual is made to constantly seek out more 
                                                 
63 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 170. 
  Page 52 of 64 
 
objects and possess more things in a never-ending egoistic cycle. The second and more 
meaningful warning that Levinas presents is found in the very purpose of the Home itself, 
namely in its separation. As Levinas writes:  
But the separated being can close itself up in its egoism, that is, in the very 
accomplishment of its isolation [...] banishing the transcendental relation that alone 
permits the I to shut itself up in itself–evinces the absolute truth, the radicalism, of 
separation. Separation is not only dialectically correlated with transcendence, as its 
reverse; it is accomplished as a positive event.64 
 
From the above we see that the capacity for reflection that the Home provides for the individual 
dialectically contains a reminder of the existence of Alterity through the individual’s isolation 
and withdrawal from the elemental. It is not the possession of objects that contain a reminder 
which breaks the individual away from the act of dwelling in his Home, rather it is the Home and 
the isolation that it provides which forces the individual to recognize his desire for 
companionship. To put this another way, the Home for Levinas is inherently lonely and it is 
loneliness that plagues the individual in his Home reminding him that “I must have been in 
relation with something I do not live from”.65 
 The relation that Levinas speaks of is nothing other than the first relation had by the 
individual; his relation with the Feminine. After being abandoned with the metaphysical desire 
associated with his encounter with the Feminine, the individual is left in a state of suffering (i.e. 
of loneliness). The individual who is now aware of the Feminine Alterity is also made aware of 
his egoism. This must be the case as the Home shows him what he has, namely, his possessions 
and accomplishments, though having known companionship the individual realizes that they are 
not enough to satisfy him. In this lonely state the Home and the objects therein remind the 
                                                 
64 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 172-173. [...] added by me for subject clarity.   
65 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 170. 
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individual of what he lacks and in turn he is compelled to seek out companionship. The draw 
towards an Other that is produced by his metaphysical desire is so deeply rooted and 
foundational to his existence that it permeates his actions. In turn, the individual who is safe and 
warm in his Home is plagued by the loneliness that accompanies his thoughts and is analogously 
returned to a state of suffering. It is through faith (an outwardly directed hope) that the individual 
is able to take action ultimately in an attempt to change his current state.66 Levinas writes of the 
individual overcoming the negative state of dwelling: 
But in order that I be able to free myself from the very possession that the welcome of 
the Home establishes, in order that I be able to see things in themselves, that is, 
represent them to myself, refuse both enjoyment and possession, I must know how to 
give what I possess.67 
 
Levinas here is not speaking of a literal giving away of possessions rather he is speaking of the 
notion of hospitality, the idea of welcoming others into one’s Home.  
 The notion of hospitality of course is not merely referring to allowing people into your 
Home. Hospitality for Levinas is a much more dramatic notion. It is the very abandonment of 
safety, the potential negation of one’s own perspective or solipsism. For Levinas, hospitality is 
the offering which accompanies language and the ultimate act of faith performed by the 
individual. It is important to note that while language within Levinas’ work takes on many roles 
in this particular instance, he is referring to a specific type of language, namely the discreet 
language of the Feminine. As mentioned in a previous section, this particular type of language 
does communicate though it does so without speech. It is a subtle language marked by an 
emotional and physical welcome.68 The silent language that Levinas denotes as integral to the 
                                                 
66 This is known within Levinas as the last chance of the hero and will be discussed in detail in a coming section.  
67 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 171. 
68 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 155.  
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individual’s escape from the loneliness of the Home is analogous to the language of love of the 
Feminine. What this means is that the longing and loneliness that the individual feels while 
separated in the Home stems from his first encounters with the Feminine. He is reminded while 
in the Home that he was nurtured, loved, and made better by this relation. In this sense Levinas 
calls for the individual to give away the most important thing that belongs to him namely, his 
mastery of the world through the sharing of it. 
 It is in the opening of the Home (the welcoming), the acceptance of and need for 
intimacy that haunts the lonely individual, that we see the Home as being a vehicle for the 
individual’s faith. While the need to welcome others that stems from his isolation is a result of 
the individual’s relation with the Feminine, the solution to this loneliness is only possible 
because of his faith (hope). Remember that up until the moment where the ego nestles in the 
Home in lonely isolation that he is not merely happy; rather the individual from his perspective is 
the most important thing in the whole world. In his egoism, he is made master of all things and in 
turn is imbued with the sense of importance and power that accompanies it. With this in mind the 
very notion of giving up this power while relinquishing his security through the welcoming of 
others into his Home must be thought of as incredibly difficult. Just as was mentioned when 
discussing the individual coming face to face with the Other, it seems shocking that the egoistic 
individual who is safe in his Home would simply give up his mastery of the world in order to 
share his possessions, yet now that the individual has faith it is a much more likely scenario. As 
Levinas writes:  
And the other whose presence is discreetly an absence, with which is accomplished the 
primary hospitable welcome which describes the field of intimacy, is the Woman. The 
woman is the condition for recollection, interiority of the home, and inhabitation [...] In 
human welcome the language that keeps silence remains an essential possibility. Those 
comings and goings of the Feminine being whose footsteps reverberate the secret depths 
of being are not the turbid mystery of the animal and feline presence whose strange 
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ambiguity Baudelaire likes to evoke. The separation that is concretized through the 
intimacy of the dwelling outlines new relations with the elements.69 
 
The individual is able to open his Home thus transforming it into a Home because of the faith 
(the outwardly directed hope) he feels towards the Feminine Alterity. He is so passionate for the 
Feminine, has such a positive desire based on of his past relations that he is willing to potentially 
lose everything for it. The reverberations of the Feminine which Levinas speaks of are nothing 
other than the accumulation of the individual’s positive memories of the Feminine70 and in turn 
the individual opens his Home and relinquishes his security as a result of his faith in the 
Feminine Alterity. What is important to note here is that this act contains no guarantee. There is 
no rational justification for the individual to think that relinquishing his security will end in 
anything but his death. It is faith, the hope that the individual feels towards the Feminine, that 
drives him to act against his own self preservation. Through the opening of his Home and his 
world to the possibility of further relations with the Feminine Alterity, the individual is able to 
live a life of faith and it is the welcoming into the Home that instigates this.   
  Without the Feminine the individual would not know loneliness and to this point he 
would not be able to escape its suffering. His faith allows the individual to have hope for the 
Feminine and to recognize the necessity of the Feminine Alterity in his world. This faith in turn 
is what allows the individual to come face to face with the Other and reverberates throughout his 
life. It informs his perspective, shapes his house into a Home, and when considered in the face of 
an Other, gives him a chance at freedom from his egoistic desires.  
 Before going further, it is very important to address a possible misunderstanding that 
could arise from the account that I have given of the suffering individual. It would appear that 
                                                 
69 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 155-156. […] Added by me to maintain subject clarity.  
70 It is important to note that this does not necessarily rely on the existence of an actual woman rather, it is 
dependent on whatever form of the Feminine evoked the new form of desire within the individual.   
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when the individual is left alone in his Home, he suffers. This is true, though this suffering is not 
a suffering of solitude in the sense of the individual’s solitary existence; rather it is the suffering 
of loneliness. Now, this distinction may seem purely semantic, but for Levinas it is not. The 
solitude of existence for Levinas is the subjective nature of the individual and represents the 
mastery of world through his own egoism. In this sense solitude can be seen as both the source of 
mastery and dignity for the individual. The suffering that is the focus of this section is of a 
different sort in that it stems from the removal of relationships. As such this suffering can only 
effect an individual who has already been made aware of the Feminine Alterity, and her 
importance. The loneliness of the individual who is aware of his egoism through the 
companionship afforded by the Feminine Alterity is in a state which shakes his very way of 
thinking. Before the Feminine, the individual only wanted for himself and the House acted as the 
receptacle for his accomplishments. Now that the individual is alone and for the first time 
realizes what it truly means to be alone (i.e. without companionship) the individual experiences 
the opposite of mastery. The House becomes about the revulsion towards attainability. It is a 
monument to being without her. This is the suffering of the lonely individual and is what 
ultimately draws him away from the house and towards a Home for sharing with an Other.    
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Conclusions: 
Why Hope?  
 In the above section I have shown how faith as an outwardly directed hope comes to 
affect the individual and how it is actualized while in the house. And though this may have 
demonstrated the notion of faith as being hope for the individual, it does not offer a direct and 
solid foundation for this definition as found within Levinas’ work. From the above consideration 
of the Home I demonstrated why it is hope; I must now demonstrate why it has to be hope. In 
this section I will offer a justification for hope by examining the notion of suffering in 
connection with Levinas’ words on the hero and the notion of the last chance. Ultimately, I will 
demonstrate that hope is the only active recourse for the suffering individual and in turn the only 
possible definition for faith within Levinas’ works.   
 Levinas begins his discussion on heroism by first outlining the relationship that suffering 
has to death, stating that:  
In suffering there is, at the same time as the call to an impossible nothingness, the 
proximity of death. There is not only the feeling and the knowledge that suffering can 
end in death. Pain of itself included like a paroxysm.71 
 
From this we see that for Levinas, the suffering of the individual which occurs as a result of his 
loneliness both reminds and informs him that death is a possibility. Suffering in this sense 
reveals the potential disconnection from being that occurs with death and unveils through 
analogy the opposite of transcendence (i.e. infinity),namely, nothingness. Now, the suffering 
individual is not actually faced with nothingness, as this would imply an impossible connection 
with infinity. In other words, it would suggest a preconceived knowledge of all things (infinity) 
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which would then give the individual the ability to recognize its opposite (nothingness). Instead 
Levinas is quick to put forward that the suffering of the individual is one of need72 (in our case. 
of companionship). With this in mind, suffering and death present themselves to the individual as 
passivity or, in other words, the seeming removal of his abilities:  
This way death has of announcing itself in suffering, outside all light, is an experience 
of the passivity of the subject, which until then had been active and remained active 
even when it was overwhelmed by its own nature, but reserved its possibility of 
assuming its factual state.73 
 
 It follows that the individual who is suffering is in fact placed in a position of inaction. 
When the individual suffers he experiences that suffering as something being done to him. In this 
sense, suffering can be seen as a way of being for the individual that feels to him like a trap or a 
cage. These, of course, are mere metaphors, though they function to illustrate the passivity of this 
experience. The suffering individual does not just feel his suffering, he lives in it as if ensnared 
by an outside force. This idea is mirrored in the descriptions in the last section of the lonely 
individual who suffers in the House and embodies what is meant by Levinas who states that 
“pain and suffering are the phenomena to which the solitude of the existent is finally reduced”.74 
The overwhelming loneliness coupled with the inability to produce a solution turns the once safe 
and secure house of the suffering individual into an extension of his suffering, a reminder that he 
is alone and, without intervention, will remain that way.  
 While the suffering that Levinas describes is meant to highlight the individual’s passive 
experience of it, in actuality the individual is not without recourse. According to Levinas the 
individual is left with two options: he can either die (remain in a state of passivity) or, if he is 
willing to sacrifice everything, he can act out of faith against it. And this is precisely what was 
                                                 
72 Levinas, Time & The Other, 69.  
73 Levinas, Time & The Other, 70. 
74 Levinas, Time & The Other, 68.  
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outlined in the previous section. When the suffering individual is alone in the House he is 
reminded of the companionship he once had with the Feminine Alterity and in turn is made to 
choose to act against his suffering, through faith, or to allow his solitude to overwhelm him. 
Both, of course, are available options for the individual, but in allowing his suffering to take hold 
of him the individual is essentially resigning to death; or as Levinas puts it: “this is the passivity 
when there is no longer hope”.75 With this being the case the only viable option for the individual 
is to act against his suffering. Levinas illustrates this when he outlines the main characteristic of 
the hero ultimately pointing to an act of hope (i.e. faith) as the driving motivation for the actions 
of the suffering individual:  
Prior to death there is always a last chance; this is what heroes seize, not death. The hero 
is the one who always glimpses a last chance, the one who obstinately finds chances[...] 
In the present, where the subject’s mastery is affirmed, there is hope. Hope is not added 
to death by a sort of salto mortale, by a sort of inconsequence; it is in the very margin 
that is given, at the moment of death, to the subject who is going to die. [Dum] 
Spiro/spero.76 
 
From this we see that the individual who suffers while reminded of the possibility of death is 
moved to act out against his own annihilation. The “last chance” of Levinas is the embodiment 
of hope that moves the individual to overcome his suffering. While this could be seen as Levinas 
merely describing an act of desperation it is with the addition of Cicero’s famous phrase (dum 
spiro spero/ while I breathe, I hope) that we are shown that hope is meant to be much more to the 
individual. While alone in the House the individual suffers for the companionship of the Other 
and in turn what motivates him and drives him to relinquish his safety is faith. The egoistic greed 
that would normally motivate the atheistic individual is cast aside when he cries for help (i.e. 
relinquishes his safety by opening up his house into a Home). 
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Final Thoughts 
 To this point I have shown how the egoistic individual is changed through his encounter 
with the Feminine Alterity which awakens within him a metaphysical desire for companionship. 
As a result of this desire the individual is forever changed and is no longer able to simply live a 
life of atheistic happiness. Instead he is plagued by the suffering of her absence, locked in a 
house that reminds him of the Other that he once lived for. In this state of solitude and 
abandonment the suffering individual, through an act of faith, cries out for the Other, ultimately 
abandoning his relative safety for possibility of ending his suffering. It is this account that 
encompasses all of the preconditions necessary for the individual to receive and accept the 
judgement of the Absolute Other. Without the Feminine the individual would never look 
outwardly. Without metaphysical desire he would not open his house. And without faith he 
would not seek out an Other. 
 With the introduction of faith, ethics remains the source of freedom for the individual 
with the revelatory encounter with the Other resting at its core. This freedom, with its 
unwavering responsibility for others, still represents a difficult and relentless form of ethics that 
is ultimately dependent on the individual abandoning his wants for a deeper metaphysical desire. 
And while faith does not make this task any easier, it does make it possible. Faith gives the 
individual a chance at freedom and a chance at shaking off his egoism in lieu of the judgement of 
others. Hope motivates the individual to look outside himself while weakening his egoism which 
makes revelation possible, but not guaranteed. To this end, the introduction of faith helps to 
highlight the difficulty that the individual faces when dealing with the Feminine and how he is 
capable of resolving it. This is evident in that the Feminine Alterity and the desire that she brings 
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about within the individual straddles the transcendent and the familiar which makes her both 
desirable and Other. She is both a thing that is wanted and a thing that can not be had and while 
this does give her the benefit of communicating with the individual through a language that he 
will understand (i.e. want), it also leaves room for his ego. Just as the finite individual can not be 
expected to recognize the infinite of the absolute Other without some sort of preconditioning, he 
too can not be magically made to respect the Alterity of the Feminine. It is still in the nature of 
the individual to wrongly objectify (make consumable) the Feminine. He tends to conflate his 
metaphysical desire with a physical need, thus manifesting an overemphasis on lust and 
sexuality. Similarly, he attributes his desire of the Feminine to the want of a woman ultimately 
idealizing beauty standards, gender, and biology. Needless to say that examples of this remain 
prevalent in our society and seem to stem from an systematic proclivity towards objectification. 
Levinas’ descriptions of the individual account for such a proclivity and subsequently map out 
the egoistic roots that make up its foundation. In doing so, we are presented with an explanation 
of this behaviour as well as the tools to uproot it. Tina Chanter articulates this concept to 
perfection when she states that:       
Rather, he [Levinas] has taken femininity seriously and not merely defused the 
Feminine either by putting it down as ‘weak’ or by dressing it up to make it acceptable 
but only on male terms. It is the world of male values, the universal rule of reason, the 
law of totality that Levinas is reacting against when he says ‘the virile judgement of 
history…of “pure reason” is cruel’.77 
 
The cruelty of the history, the objectifying and disconnected interpretation of the totality of a  
situation, perpetuates the egoism of the individual. Through metaphysical desire and the faith 
that it produces Levinas shows that we are capable of breaking free from the violence of “the 
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fabrication of a thing, the satisfaction of a need, the desire and even the knowledge of an 
object”.78 Faith as outlined in this thesis offers the individual a slight reprieve from the harsh 
cycle of his egoism. It allows him to be drawn outward towards the gentleness of others, but it is 
not a encounter that marks the complete separation of the individual from his egoism. Faith on 
the other hand merely makes the individual aware of his egoism by compelling him to seek out 
the companionship of others. In this sense through the constant reminder of the Alterity of the 
Feminine that faith provides the individual is meant to be deterred from the objectification 
others. Having now a knowledge of the role of faith we may be able to understand the unjust 
behaviours of the individual and ultimately attempt to curb our own proclivities towards 
objectification. For as Levinas writes “violence is consequently also any action which we endure 
without at every point collaborating in it”.79  
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